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Social Security and Pensions
ABSTRACT
Recent and proposed changes in the social security statutes can have
profound etfects on worker behavior and on pensions themselves. In the
context of an optimal lifetime compensation plan, pensions depend on efficient
dates of retirement. TO the extent that changes in social security affect the
efficient date of retirement, both the pension and the wage profile itself
will react. Four proposed changes in the social security system are analyzed.
The cost savinjs associated with the change, as well as the effect on pensions
and worker compensation in general are discussed.
Edward P. Lazear
Graduate School of Business
University of Chicago
1101 East 58th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
312—962—7464This essay is an attempt to understand the effects of proposed changes in
the rules governing the receipt of social security on private pension
formulas.Four policy proposals are considered. Both short-run and long—run
implicationsare analyzed. An empirical strategy, which allows the estimation
of the magnitudes of the effects, is described. In addition to examining the
effects on pension formulas, an intermediate step is the determination of
changes in retirement behavior. A by-product is a discussion of the effects
of the proposed changes on costs to the social security system.
I. Social Security and Optimum Retirement
The basic assumption to be employed throughout this analysis is that
firms and workers agree to engage in arrangements that are privately
efficient. This implies that they maximize the joint value of output and
leisure. More specifically, it implies that work occurs when and only when
the private value of work exceeds the value of the worker's leisure. There is
a large literature that employs this notion. Becker, Landes, and Michael
(1977), Lazear (1979), Hashimoto and Yu (1980), and Hall and Lazear (1984) are
a few examples of a principle that is by now reasonably well understoodamong
practitioners.
The reason that the "privately efficient" is distinguished from efficient
is that social security creates distortions which enable firms and workers to
act opportunistically against the system. By selecting one date of retirement
over another, it is possible to make both firms and workers better off. This
'A related idea was exposited by Feldstein (1976) andpursued by others
including Topel (1983).—2—
is because there is no monotonic link between the amount received in social
security payments by the worker and the length of the work life so the rela-
tion of contributions to benefits received is not appropriate for efficiency.2
The implication is that changes in social security are likely to affect the
private optimum date of retirement. In order to understand the effects of
social security on private pensions, it is first necessary to understand the
way that the social security system alters the retirement decision.
There are five primary ways that the social security system distorts the
relationship between workers1 worth to the firm and the value of leisure. The
first is the vesting provision. Social security requires that (under most
circumstances) a worker have 40 contributing quarters in order to be fully
insured. This means that the value of working the 40th quarter far exceeds
the value of output produced by the worker at the firm.
Second, social security benefits levels are a function of the average
wage that the worker receives over his entire lifetime (adjusted for wage
inflation). If the worker's productivity is not constant over the lifetime,
his average wage is affected by when he chooses to retire. This is derived
more formally below, but it implies that a worker can affect the size of his
benefits by altering his retirement date.
Third, it has been argued convincingly (see, for example, Gordon and
Blinder (1980), Mitchell and Fields (1984), Burkhauser (1976)), that social
security is not actuarially neutral of the date of retirement, independent of
the wage effect already mentioned. The current consensus is that workers who
retire before 65 do not have benefits with expected present values as high as
2The relationship sometimes goes the wrong way since workers who remain
with the firm for a longer time pay a larger amount in, but may actually
receive less in benefits from the system if they continue to work beyond 65.—3—
otherwise identical workers who retire at 65. The direction of the bias is
not essential. What is important is that the value of benefits is not
independent of the age of retirement.
Fourth, the earnings test implies that workers who continue to work
beyond age 65 lose benefits permanently that are not made up in higher
payments later on. This implies that even if the present value of benefits
rises with work to age 65 (or more exactly, with the election to defer receipt
of payments until 65), the reverse is true for work beyond that date. More
will be said about this issue below.
Finally, since the system is financed by the current working generation
(and its employers), continuing to work increases the contributions to the
system without necessarily changing the amount of benefits. This link is the
least well defined, however, because of the pay—as—you-go nature of the
system. Not only is any one worker's benefits in large part independent of
his contributions to the system, but an entire generation's benefits may be
independent of its contributions.
With these points in mind, let us derive the worker's true wage at each
pointin his life cycle as a function of age of retirement.
The worker's problem is to maximize lifetime utility. In this simplest
ofproblems there are two components: leisure and pecuniary wealth, which are
assumed separable in the utility function. The worker can select the number
of years of work after which to retire. If Y(t) is the worker's pecuniary
wealth if he works t years including social security, L(T' —t)is the
total value of leisure when he works t years, where T'is the year of





Equation Cia) says that theworkershould equate the value of incremental
leisure with his income per period since Y'(t) is income.
For the purposes of this study, Y(t) consists of three components:
direct earnings from work (net of taxes including FICA), social security
wealth, which the worker creates by participating in the covered sector of the
labor market, and pension wealth. In a competitive labor market, it must be
the case that the worker's total income through T equals his total lifetime
product through T, where P is selected time of retirement. Let V(t) be
the present value of lifetime product through year t and v(t) be the
incremental product associated with the tth year of work. Define W(T) as
lifetime wage income. If pension wealth were zero, then
(2) v(T) =W(T)
However, it need not be true that
v'(t)v(t) =w(t) w'(t)
for any t. It is not necessary that the wage at any point in time equal that
year's marginal product.
Now, social security wealth, S, depends not only upon years worked, but
also upon the average salary, adjusted for inflation. So
(3) S =S(T,(T))
where (T) is the average salary earned through T, conditional upon
retirement at T (adjusted for inflation). The properties of SC.) have—5—
already been mentioned. First,
(4)(a) S1 =0 for T < where T* is the normal date
of retirement (currently 65)
(b) s<0 for T >T*
(c) S is discontinuous at 10
(d) 52>0
Statement (4c) is the vesting rule. Statement (4d) says thatup to a point,
the higher are average earnings, the higher are social security benefits.
Statement (4b) is the earnings test: Work beyond the normal date results in
the withdrawal of benefits, which are never made up. Statement (4a)says that
years of service (other than 10) do not affect benefits. This may seem
confusing, given the earlier statement that early retirement benefits are
lower than normal retirement benefits. But retiring at,say, T* -3,does
not require that the worker receive benefits at that point. In fact, if
workers could borrow against social security wealth, no one would ever elect
to start benefits before T*, irrespective of the date of retirement. Below
the assumption of perfect capital markets is relaxed.3






If r =0,then from (5) and (6),
3mis also implies that the earnings test betweenyears T* —3and T*
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(7) = =(v(T)-v(T))
Equation (7) says that the change in the average wage from one additional year
of work must be the same as the effect of the marginal product of that year on
the average, independent of the shape of the age—earnings profile. Since
totals must add up, averages must be the same. This means that for these
purposes, the wage profile is irrelevant. Only the V(t) profile must be
analyzed.
Somewhat aside, if r > 0, then there is an incentive to steepen the
profile relative to the true productivity profile. By "lending" to the firm,
the wOrker gets to count the firm's interest repayment as part of the average
wage upon which social security payments are based.
For simplicity, assume that r =0so that (3) becomes
(8) S =S(T,(T))
Now, the private return to work T is
Y(T) =W(T)+S(T,w(T)
=V(T)+S(T,w(T))
so from (5), (7), and (8),y(T), defined as the change in private wealth
associated with retiring one year later, is








Atypical pattern is illustrated in Figure 1.
The y(T) path shown is the value of working the Tth year on the
assumption that year T is the final year. For T < 10,there is no social
security effect. At T =10there is a spike in the y(T) function because
the worker becomes fully insured at (10) earnings. For 10 < T < T*,
S1 =0,but 0. At T0, v(T0) =v(T0),but for T >T0the
marginal is below the average, pulling it down. At T >T*,the earnings
test takes hold so that each additional year's earnings are offset by a
corresponding decrease in social security wealth. This causes a kink in the
y function since S1 is no longer zero and its effect must be added to that
dv of S2.
Note that in Figure 1, social security induces earlier retirement than
would otherwise occur. The earnings test pushes in this direction, but so
does gearing benefits to average wage when the final years are associated with
declining productivity.4 Additionally, zero interest tends to artificially
depress the slope of y relative to that of v. Figure 2 illustrates another
possibility where social security may or may not result in earlier retirement
depending upon the value of leisure. If leisure value is L' rather than
L',thenthe social security system induces later retirement.
The point is that it is privately optimal (for the firm and worker
jointly) to declare that retirement occurs at the time when the worker's
value, including increases or decreases in social security, equals the value
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of his leisure. Changes in social security payments are likely to change that
date.
II. Total Worth, Wages and Pensions
The y(T) path that was derived in the last section can be thought of as
the total private worth of the worker. It is linked to pensions and wages
because the worker's pension and wage path affects the date at which the
worker chooses to retire. It is privately efficient to have the worker retire
at the intersection of y(T) and L(T' -T),but the worker only chooses
that date if it is forced upon him (via mandatory retirement) or if his total
compensation is set up in a way that induces him to choose the efficient date
as his optimum.
The theory that links pensions and wages to retirement is exposited in
four papers (Lazear 1979, 1981, 1983, 1984). It would require too much space
to fully exposit those ideas here, so only a sketch of the methodology with
more explicit derivations of the essential relationships is provided.
In Lazear (1979), I argued that an age—earnings profile that was steeper
than the age—productivity effects would produce incentives for the worker to
perform more efficiently on the job. By paying workers less than they are
worth when young and more than they are worth when old, the young and old
alike are induced to work harder than they otherwise would. Steepening the
profile raises the cost of losing the job for poor performance.
There are two direct consequences of this approach for motivating
workers: First, a pension or some lump sum after retirement is a necessary
part of the optimal profile. This ensures that the effort level during the
final years is the efficient one (derived explicitly in Lazear (1981)).—11—
Second, the profile distorts the labor supply decision. Workers, left to
their own devices, choose to quit work when the value of leisureexceeds the
wage, not the true value of work. If the worker could be forced to work only
when it was efficient to do so, then all, including theworker, could be made
better off. Herein lies the explanation for mandatory retirement.Mandatory
retirement, by forcing the worker to retire at the efficientage, permits the
firm to pay the worker the appropriate amount over his lifetime.If the
worker were permitted to work beyond that date, the distortion in laborsupply
induced by tilting the age-earnings profile wouldcause him to work longer.
But the value of these additional years to the firm falls short of the value
of forgone leisure. Thus, over the worker's entire lifetime(although not
during the final years) the increment in payment does not cover the cost of
leisure. The firm that uses mandatory retirement at theappropriate date is
able to attract all workers.
Figure 3 illustrates this. The worker is worth y in the finalyear
P. Paying the worker w(T) rather than y(T) provides theappropriate
incentives for effort. The problem is that the worker prefers to retireat
P1 rather than T*. If the worker were permitted to work until T1, then in
competition the firm would pay the worker the present value of OABC over his
lifetime. With mandatory retirement at T*,the firm pays OADE, but the
worker has additional leisure from T* toT1 The mandatory retirement
scheme is better iff the value of the additional leisure exceeds the incre-
mental payment to the worker. This amounts to asking whether EDFC islarger
than EDBC. It is under all circumstances.
This distortion is not confined to retirement at T. Tilting theage—
earnings profile causes workers to be too reluctant to leave, even when









plan can rectify the situation. Figure 4 illustrates the problem and the
solution.
Suppose that a worker receives wage w(T) for each year through T* and
a pension, the value of which is EFGH, upon retirement at T*. The size of
EFGH is chosen to solve the end—period effort problem, taking intoaccount
the worker's access to capital markets, his desired savings,progressive
income taxes, and his confidence that the firm will not defaulton its pension
promise. (All are discussed in detail in Lazear (1981).)
The problem is that at to,theworker may find that his alternative use
of time is unexpectedly high, sayw0. This might result because he receives
an unexpected outside offer, or because the value of his leisure rises,say,
due to illness. The worker chooses to remain because w(t)> Yet all
could be made better off if the worker were to leave. In fact, the
appropriate amount of severance pay could make all better off.
In Lazear (1983, 1984), I show that the efficient severancepay is
ABCD +EFGH.Under these circumstances, the firm is indifferent between
retaining or losing the worker. If he stays, the firm pays tOBCT* +EFGH
and gets value of tOADT*, yielding a quasi—loss of ABCD+EFGH.If he
leaves, the firm simply makes a direct payment of ABCD +EFGH.Both policies
yield the same profit to the firm. But the worker benefits by leaving only
when it is efficient. If > v*(t), then the worker receives ABCD +
t0JKT* + EFGH, which exceeds t0BCT* + EFGH.
This implies that the optimal severance pay is ABCD + EFGH. Apension,
the expected present value of which declines withage of retirement beyond
t, can act as exactly this kind of severancepay. Indeed, in Lazear (1983,
1984) I find strong evidence to suggest that the decline in present value of










The link between pensions, y(t), and w(t) is established: Let P(T)
he the expected present value of the pension if retirement occurs at time T.
Assume that (T) >y(T)implies that '(t) > y(t) for t >T.For
simplicity, continue to assume that interest is zero. Then the worker retires
* attime T —1iff
(10) (T) ÷ P(T —1)> w(T) +P(T)
Select the pension optimally so that
(11) T-1 - = w(T)—y(T)
Substitute (11) into (10) to obtain the result that the worker retires early




(12) (T) > y(T)
which is the criterion for private efficiency.
III. Social Security and Pensions
All the necessary tools are now available to analyze the impact of
changes in social security on pensions. Since equation (11) gives the rela-
tionship between pensions, wages and y, we need only detern-tine the effects
of social security on y(T), and to a lesser extent on w(T) and P(T*).
Neither w(T) nor P(T*) are likely to be affected much by changes in social
security relative to y(T). The determinants of w(T) and P(T*) have to do
with life cycle savings, capital markets, and firm default. Of these, life—16—
cycle savings is the determinant most likely to be affected, but even its role
is limited. Each is considered along with the various policy changes.
A. Delay Without Reduction in Social Security
(1) The Basic Analysis
The first policy to be considered does not imply any direct cost savings
for the social security system, but indirect savings are present. Consider
shifting the entire actuarial relationship that currently exists for retire-
ment between 62 and 65 to ages 65 to 68. The expected present value of
pension benefits, given retirement at 65 would be equal to the current
expected present value for retirement at age 62. Similarly, 66 corresponds to
63, and so forth.
The key to understanding the effect on pensions is to understand how this
alters the basic shape of y(T) as shown in Figure 1. Equation (9) is the
determining factor.
Define T* as the number of years of work that corresponds to retirement
at age 65. Then for T < T* -3,the policy has no effect on y(T) since,
from equation (9), neither v(T),S1 or S2 is altered. Whether or not
there is a change between age 62 and age 65 depends upon the assumption about
capital markets. For this policy change and the next, continue to assume that
capital markets are perfect. For the last two changes, that assumption is
relaxed to illustrate the differences that are introduced by this assumption.
If capital markets are perfect, and workers can borrow against their
social security wealth, then S1is zero between 62 and 65 because workers
need not take the benefits early, even if they retire early. But under the
current regime, it always pays to begin the benefits at age 65 and then the
earnings test starts to bite. Reductions in social security payments via the
earnings test are not made up so the y(T) declines more steeply after 65.—17—
Under the proposed scenario, workers would not elect to receive social
security until age 68 because to do so would reduce the present value of
benefits. But after age 68, the earnings Lest iould take hold. Figure 5
shows the change.
Under the new
68, or at T* +3.
* shiftsto T +3.
policy, the earnings test does not become binding until age
The kink that exists at T* under the current system
Further, the decline is more rapid on the Y1(T) function
function. The reason is that the payment per year is than on the y0(T)
larger on 1 than Yoinorder tokoep actuarial values the same while
making benefit payments over a smaller number of years.
The effects on retirement age depend upon the value of the alternative
use of time. Individuals who would have retired under the old regime between
T* and T0 will delay retirementsomewhat. The switch to the new system
makes work between T* and T0 more rewarding so some individuals are
induced to remain in the labor force longer. However, there are those with
values of leisure between L0 and L1 who would have retired at T* under
the old system, but at T such that T* < T < T* +3under the new system.
Those workers receive benefits that are less than the full value because of
the non—neutral relationship of early retirement social security to normal
retirement social security. But they would have received the full amount
under the old system because they retire after T* under the old system.
This implies that social security costs are reduced on these individuals.
Individuals whose value of leisure lies between L1 andL2 also retire
later under the new regime. But the effects on the cost to the system are
ambiguous here. Under the old regime, those workers would have worked beyond
*T,forgoingsome benefits as a result. The same is true in the new regime.







a greater number of years than in the new system. But because actuarial
values are the same across systems at normal retirement age, the benefits per
year are smaller under the old system. The net effect is ambiguous.
Workers who have a value of time that is lower than L2 retire at an
earlier age under the new regime than under the old. Here the effect is to
increase costs to the social security system. Under the old system these
workers received benefits for fewer years and the benefits per year were
smaller.
In order to derive the effect of the policy change on pensions, it is
necessary to examine what happens to the wage path and to the pension at the
normal date of retirement. Since the kink in the v function has moved
from T* to T* +3,it is now likely that the modal age of optimal retire-
ment will move from age 65 to age 68. This means that pensions are likely to
follow suit, declaring that as the normal age of retirement. But what is
"normal age" is in large part semantics. What is important is the relation of
value of pensions taken before that date to pensions taken at that date.
Equation (11) allows us to examine what happens.
If it were privately optimal for workers to work longer under the new
regime, then either the wage profile or pensions at normal retirement age must
be adjusted downward. The reason is that during the final years, workers are
overpaid relative to their worth to the firm. The longer they remain with the
firm, the greater is the quasi—loss, which must be made up by an adjustment in
the profile or the pension. One would expect that the adjustment would work
partly through the pension and partly through the wage. Fewer years of
retirement imply that in a life—cycle savings context, workers prefer to take
relatively less of their income after retirement.—20--
This logic, along with equation (11), yields specific implications for
the way that pensions change with the change in social security policy.
First, the normal age of retirement goes up. Second, the pension received
upon reaching normal age is smaller. (This implies a smaller accrual rate for
each year of work.) Third, since w1(t) lies below w0(t) and since Yi
lies above Y0 between T* and T* +3,the rate of decline in pension
benefits with additional years of work after age 65 is smaller in the new
regime than in the old. The intuition is that since it is privately optimal
s-—.. --—-— ,._;L_.__.._______ -__- '——., i——- I..U WULJULi1IUL LIL J11J.UIL.L Uk) .LIIWciy L11a1- LJ.L% LL
discourage delayed retirement beyond age 65. Fourth, using the same logic,
before age 65, the decline in pension value with delayed retirement is less
pronounced under the new structure than under the old. But the differences
will not be great. Until age 65, the only differences that result come from
the change in the age—earnings profile, not in the y function. Those
changes are not likely to be large. Finally, changes in the decline in
pension value with additional years worked after T0 are ambiguous. The
shift in the y function is in the same direction as the shift in the w
function so the net effect on W —vis ambiguous.
In addition to these direct effects, there may be indirect effects as
well. Since the present value of the pension upon attainment of normal age is
smaller and since the rate of decline in pension benefits for delayed retire-
ment before normal age is smaller (dPT/dT is closer to zero), this implies
that total pension payments are likely to be smaller as well. But in competi-
tion workers must be paid their lifetime marginal products. Only if the
additional overpayment in wages that occurs between the old T and the new
normal age, T* +3,(since w(T) > v(T) for T >T*)exactly offsets the
reduced pension costs, are there no indirect effects. Otherwise, the pension—21—
and/orwage profile must be readjusted to ensure that
* * T+3 * T+3
(13) fw(t)ertdt+P(T+3)=Jv(t)ertdt
0 0
holds, where T* +3is the normal date of retirement. This is the lifetime
constraint that workers be paid their marginal products. Since this net
effect is necessarily ambiguous, a priori, and it may not be unreasonable to
assume that the effects cancel each other out.
In a nutshell, a change in social security that moves the entire
actuarialrelationship back three years tends to reduce the average pension
level, but more importantly, to reduce the penalty associated with delayed
retirement.
2. An Empirical Strategy
Itis possible to be more specific for empirical implementation. What is
required is information on y0, y1, w0, w1, PT* under the old system and
* underthe new system. What is currently observable is w0, P, the
current and proposed social security payments and how they vary with age of
retirement. The rest of the variables are not directly observable. However,
knowing the structure of the social security system allows us to obtain the
y functions once v is known. Equation (9) permits that inference.
The first trick is to infer v0 from existing data. As I have shown in
Lazear (1983, 1984), this can be done under the assumption that the pension
system is set up efficiently. In fact, equation (11) is all that is needed.
The only thing that is not observed in equation (11) is y.It can be
inferred by using this difference equation and information on the current
pension plan, and the current wage profile. This, along with equation (9),
allows estimation of the v0 profile. Once the v0 profile has been
identified using the present data, it is a simple matter to couple it with the—22—
proposed social security system to obtain Yi' again using equation (9).
All that is missing now is information on w1 and on P * under the
T +3
new system. As already mentioned there is some ambiguity here. However, we
are not without some guidance. First, there are constraints placed on the
relationship between P, w and v. In particular, zero profits implies that
equation (13) must hold if all individuals retired at the normal age. One
assumption that is not unreasonable is that the pension value at T* +3j
reduced relative to that under the old system at T* to reflect shorter
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to80 and received a pension the expected present value of which was $200,000,
then under the new system, they would get 12/15 of $200,000, or $160,000 as
pension. This number, along with the v(t) profile already estimated, can be
substituted into equation (13) to determine the change in the present value of
the w(t) path. Although there is no way to say specifically how that path
would change, again some sort of proportional reduction would not be
unreasonable as a first approximation. An alternative is to assume that the
annual pension flow would be kept constant.
This technique identifies all the relevant variables. The information
generated along with equation (11) allows the analyst to estimate the exact
shape of the private pension path that will correspond to the new social
security structure.
3. Short Run vs. Long Run
This discussion has focused on the long run, ignoring any effects that
might occur during some interim stage. There is the short run to consider,
however, for workers who are currently with the firm, have a wage path already
established, and already have pension rights. What is likely to happen to
their pensions?—23—
For the most part, this is not an important issue. It is unlikely that a
change in the social security system of the kind being considered will not
have enough lead time built into it so that the long run analysis is
appropriate for almost all workers. Even if the change is to occur within
five to ten years, there are sufficient degrees of freedom in the wage and
pension accrual paths to allow the arrangement to quickly approach that of the
long—run equilibrium.
Still, it is interesting to examine what might happen in the short run if
the change in the structure of social security were to occur immediately and
were completely unanticipated. The issue is best addressed by asking whether
there exists a mid-career Pareto move that can be made, given the history of
wages and pension accrual.
Consider a worker who has not yet reached T*, the old regime's date of
normal retirement. If there were to be no change in the wage profile, then it
would be optimal to flatten the rate of decline in pension value for retire-
ment delayed to some time between T* and T0 in Figure 5. By the logic of
equations (1O)—(12), such a change induces the worker to leave only when
privately optimal and this necessarily can make the worker better off without
making the firm worse off. However, given the current pension already
accrued, flattening the pension decline in a way that was not anticipated when
the wage and pension accrual paths were set up serves to increase the cost of
the worker to the firm. To the extent that this increased cost is not offset
by increased output (and in these final years of work, that is likely to be
the case), the worker's compensation must be reduced somehow.
There are two obvious candidates. The first is the level of pension
benefits to which the worker would be entitled at T*.If this can be
reduced, then the rate at which pension declines with age of retirement can—24—
also be reduced without a corresponding increase in expected pension costs.
There are some legal restrictions on what employers can do to reduce pension
values. What would be necessary here is a slowdown in the rate of pension
accrual before T* and a speedup in accrual rates from T* to T0. Whether
or not this can be accomplished in the current legal and union environment is
questionable.
The second candidate is the wage profile itself. The appropriate trade-
off is to flatten the wage profile at the same time that the pension decline
is lessened. In order to do this while creating the correct incentives, the
reduction in wages relative to the current structure must occur for workers
with less than T* of seniority. Otherwise, all that is accomplished by
flattening the pension decline is undone by the reduction in wages. What
would be most preferred, although hardly feasible, is to levy a once—and—f or—
all lump sum tax on the current work force, to be given back in higher pension
benefits later on.
Unfortunately, it turns out that even with lump sum taxes, there is no
way to alter the shape of the age—compensation profile mid—stream without
raising distributional issues.5 The way to see this is to show that there is no
wage—pension path that brings about efficiency and also leaves the firm no
worse off across all workers. It can be accomplished for any one group, but
not for all, even if a lump sum fee is charged.
Letting 0 denote the existing and 1 denote the proposed, consider a
worker who, under the old regime, would have retired at T*, but under the
new regime should retire at T* +1for private optimality. If C is the
lump sum, then it must be true that, at one year before retirement,
5This is not a problem when workers first join the firm because sorting




Equation (14) ensures that profits do not change as a result of the scheme
(since profits were zero under the old scheme).
Although v(T) is exogenous and w0, p0 are predetermined, it is still
possible to set P1 and w1 in a way that guarantees efficiency via equation
(11). Because of the free parameter, C, no change in profit is necessary.
This is no longer true once we recognize that there are other individuals
with different retirement behavior at the firm. For example, consider an
individual who would have retired at T* +1under the old scheme, but at
T* ÷ 2 under the new. In order to leave the firm indifferent, equation (15)
must hold:
(15) wO(T*) +wo(T*+1)+ p0(p* +1)—v(T*)—v(T*+1)
=w1(T*)+w1(T*÷ 1) +w1(T*+2)+p1(T*+2)
—v(T*)—v(T*+1)—v(T*+2)—C




To guarantee private optimality, (11) must hold so that
(17) a. p0(T* +1)—p0(T*)=y0(T*+1)—w0(T+1)
b. Pi(T* +2)—Pl(T*+1)=y1(T*+2)—wl(T*+2)
Substitution of (17a, b) into (16) yields
(18) v(T* +2)—yl(T*+2)=v(T*+1)—yo(T*+1)
But the relationship between y and v is exogenous to the firm, determined—26—
solely by the social security system as in (9). Thus, it is impossible to
guarantee that (18) will hold. Redistributive effects are a necessary
consequence. The way that firms and workers iron out these differences cannot
be resolved here. This requires a theory of bargaining. As such, short—run
changes cannot be specified unambiguously.
B. Equal Flows Deferred to Later Ages
The next policy change that is considered is a shift in the flow of
benefits to older ages. Specifically, consider making age 68 the date of
normal entitlement, at which point entitlees would receive the same annual
benefit flow as they currently do at age 65. Similarly, 65 would become the
age of early retirement and they would be entitled to the same annual benefits
then as they currently are now at age 62. Such a change results in an
apparent cost savings because the actuarial value of the pension is reduced
(same payment for fewer years).
In many ways this is similar to the previous analysis, but there are some
differences. Some of the ambiguities about the dates of retirement and the
cost of the system are removed. Again, with the help of equation (9), Figure
6 can be constructed to illustrate the differences between the before and
after y profiles.
There are two notable shifts. First, it remains the case that the
perfect capital market assumption guarantees that receipt of social security
payment begins at the peak of actuarial value, but not before. This implies
that the kink point moves from T* to T* +3.Second, since the actuarial
value of social security benefits is smaller at normal age under the new
regime than under the old, the deviation of y from v tends to be smaller.
It is clear that such a scheme induces an increase in the age of retire-






L0 retires earlier under the new scheme than under the old. All of those for
whom the alternative value of time lies below L0 have unchanged retirement
behavior. This implies an unambiguous reduction in the cost of the social
security system. No workers receive benefits for a larger number of years
under the new system than under the old and each year pays the same benefits
as it would have before. Additionally, if <0, then the benefits per year
are reduced as well from continued work (from (18)).
Since the average age of retirement rises, it is likely that the firm
will change the normal age of retirement to reflect this. In fact, it is
likely to change to T* ÷ 3. What is the effect of the change on normal age
pension benefits? Again, since there are fewer years of retirement, life
cycle savings models imply that the pension value received upon normal age
falls as the normal age is increased. So the expected present value of
pension benefits received upon normal retirement falls. This does not imply
that the annual flow of pension benefits will fall. A working hypothesis is
that the flow of benefits per year might be left approximately unchanged as a
function of age of retirement. I.e., current pension formulas which define
benefits as a function of years of service, salary, and other factors will be
set so as to make the pension flow associated with retirement at age 68
similar to what it would have been before if work had continued to age 68.
Even if annual pension benefits conditional upon retirement at age 68
remain unchanged, it is clear that the rest of the pension formula does
change. As before, if the wage profile adjusts at all, its direction of
change seems reasonably clear. The new w(T) path is likely to lie somewhat
below the old one, in order to retain the relationship given by (13), that
expected present value of payment and output must be equalized. Maintaining
the w(t) path at its old level or dropping it in this fashion has an uriam——29—
biguous effect on pension formulas. It implies that the expected present
value of pension benefits should decline more slowly as a function of age of
retirement. Since w(T) —y(T)is smaller under the new scheme than the old
up to and perhaps beyond T* + 3 (if w(T) falls), it is clear, using
equaton (11), that pension present value must decline more slowly. Intui—
tively, this says that since there is now more private gain to postponement of
the retirement date, the pension should be set up in a way that encourages
later retirement. So as before, this change in social security includes
smaller private pensions that decline more slowly with postponed retirement.
Indirect effects are the same as in the first case considered in (A) and are
not repeated here. Similarly, the empirical strategy to be used to estimate
the new pension path is identical to that described above.
1. Short Run vs. Long Run
The same kind of analysis as performed above can be done here to
distinguish the short run from the long run. As already mentioned, short-run
impacts are not likely to be important because of lead times built into most
contemplated changes in social security policy. Still, the effects are
briefly considered.
The short—run changes are virtually identical to those of the previously
considered policy change. Again, the goal is to find a Pareto move that takes
as history the path of wages and pension accruals to that point and restruc-
tures the remaining profile from there.
Since later retirement is the objective, and specifically, since a less
rapid decline in pension value is now desired, accrual rates should be
adjusted upward, especially in the years following T*. The difficulty, as
before, is that this imposes larger costs of labor services on the firm with-
out offsetting increases in output. Also as before, it is impossible to alter—30—
wages and pensions in a way that is both privately optimal and distributional-
ly neutral. Even the imposition of a lump sum tax, with higher pension flows
later, cannot make all workers better off while leaving the firm indifferent
in every situation. If workers choose different dates of retirement, the lump
sum that is appropriate for some is not appropriate for others.
C. Increase the Actuarial Reduction
Associated with Early Retirement
Another policy that seems to reduce the cost to the social security
system is a decrease in early retirement benefits, which leave benefits
unchanged for retirement at age 65 (T*). The reason that this does not
obviously reduce the cost to the social security system is that it changes the
average age of retirement and this may offset any cost savings that accrue
from reduced benefit payments.
The effects of this policy on y illustrate the importance of the
assumption of perfect capital markets. If workers can borrow and lend at the
market rate of interest, then there are no effects of this policy at all.
Since the present value of social security benefits taken at age 65 are higher
than benefits that begin in any other year, any change to the system that
leaves untouched benefits in year of normal entitlement has no effect on y.
The y function is affected by maximum attainable benefits, as a function of
age of retirement; all other values are irrelevant. Under these circuin—
stances, there is no effect on retirement or pensions of the policy change.
This is no longer true if capital markets are imperfect. At the extreme,
suppose that workers can neither borrow nor lend and must consume only what
they receive as wages, pensions, or social security during that particular
year. With a concave utility function, workers would elect to begin receipt
of benefits as soon as they retired. The fact that there are a significant—31—
number of individuals who do opt to start benefits before 65 implies that the
perfect capital market assumption is untenable. tinder the assumption that the
worker consumes only what he earns in that particular period, the y function
shifts as shown in Figure 7.
Beginning at T =10years, the spike is smaller for y1 because an
individual who retires with only 10 years of experience is likely to elect to
receive benefits starting at 62. This also implies that S2 is likely to be
smaller, so y1 deviates from v by less than does YoAtage 62,
(T* —3),both Y0 and y1 kink upward because S1 becomes positive at
that point due to the non-neutrality of the actuarial relationship. The kink
is sharper on than on because the actuarial value of early retire-
ment is lower under the new policy so delaying retirement to age 65 is worth
more. Alter age 65, the paths converge since the new policy changes nothing
for retirement after that age.
It should be noted that it is not necessarily the case that y1 deviates
from v by a smaller amount than y0. This depends upon the cross partial,
S12 It is possible, for example, the cross partial to be zero even though
any given results in a smaller present value of social security benefits.
Also recall that what has been assumed implies that workers take their
social security benefits at the earliest possible entitlement date. This is
quite different from what was assumed in the first two cases. In those two
examples, the analysis does not change drastically. Here, it makes all the
difference because there are no effects unless workers do not take social
security in a way that maximizes the present value of their benefits.
First, consider the effects of this policy on retirement. There is no
effect on those who would have retired after T* since the policy does not








optimal to retire between T* -3and T*, retirement will be delayed some-
what under the new system. Under no circumstances is it delayed beyond age
65, but some delay is a necessary consequence of this policy change. The
reason that it cannot be delayed beyond age 65 is that each member of this
group retired at or before 65 (T*) under the current system. This implies
that the value of leisure intersected Y0 before T*. SinceY0 and
converge at 65, there is no possibility of privately optimal retirement beyond
this point.
The postponement of retirement, which comes about because the private
value of working an additional year is higher between T* and T* -3under
the new system, introduces an ambiguity into the effects of the policy change
on the costs of the social security system. Although each year of early
retirement benefits cost less under the new system and there are fewer years
during which benefits are received, that age at which the worker retires
differs under the two policies. Since age of retirement is later, and since
benefits are higher for individuals who begin benefits later, the per year
benefit could actually be greater on average under the new system. The sign
of the net effect depends upon the shapes of the two functions as well as the
value of leisure curves.
Let us turn to the effects on pensions. Again, it is first necessary to
determine the effects on p ,.SinceT* does not change, and since workers
T
are more rather than less likely to retire at or near T*, there is no ob—
vious reason to expect any change inPT*
The same is true of the wage path.
Since that path is efficiently conditional upon retirement at normal age, and
since that age does not change, there is no reason to expect w(T) to change.
This implies that w(T) —y(T)is smaller under the proposed social
security system than under the existing one. From equation (11), it follows—34—
that pensions decline less rapidly under the new system than under the old.
But this in turn implies that the average level of pension payments change as
well. The direction of the effect is clear. Since P* is unaltered, PT*l
must be smaller under the new system than under the old in order to ensure
that dpT/dT is closer to zero. Further, since retirement occurs later, if
it changes at all, the benefits are reduced even more (dPT/dT < 0). In order
to restore equilibrium, total compensation must rise to its previous level.
There are two ways this can come about: an increase in the entire wage profile
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w(T) —v(T)falls so that the speed with which pensions fall as retirement is
delayed will be reduced. If it takes the form of a rise in p ,thisis
T
because the pension is used as a "lump sum" in order to make lifetime compen-
sation equal to lifetime wealth.
To sum up: The effects on the pension plan are either: (a) P*T
increases and the rate of decline in pension value for delayed retirement
between T* -3and T* is reduced. (b) There is no change in ,,and
the rate of decline in pension value with delayed retirement between T* —3
and T* is reduced to a lesser extent.
1 •TheShort Run
As before, it is interesting to consider what happens to workers already
in the middle of their careers. Is there some way to change the pension/wage
profile to make all workers better off and not harm the firm? Again, the
proof that this cannot be done without distributional effects applies. To
bring about efficiency, it is necessary to reduce the decline in pension value
with retirement delayed to the normal age. This implies a higher pension
cost, which could conceivably be financed by a lump—sum "tax" on all existing
workers. The difficulty is that some workers benefit more than others by this—35—
change so that the policy implies distributional effects that cannot be undone
without affecting efficient retirement.
D. Spread Out Ages Over Which Social
Security Benefits Can Be Initiated
The final policy to be considered is a more gradual increase in benefits
from early retirement to normal age. Suppose that the system were changed so
that those who retired at age 62 received the same benefit flow under the new
system as under the old, and that those who retire at 68 receive under the new
system, the same annual benefits as those who retire at age 65 receive under
the old system. This change leaves the expected present value of social
security the same for retirement at age 62, but reduces it for retirement at
any other age up to 68. Figure 8 illustrates the change.
At age 68, the flow is the same as it would have been at age 65 under the
currentsystem but the number of years over which those benefits are received
is smaller. Between age 63 and 67, the flow of benefits is lower under the
proposedsystemthan under the current one so the present value is lower. For
retirementat ages 68 and beyond, the two systems yield thesame present value
ofbenefits.
Theeffects of the change in policy on y depend again upon assumptions
about capital markets. Both cases are examined. 'lbstart,assume that
capitalmarkets are perfect so that benefits always begin at the age which
guarantees maximum present value. Figure 9 depicts y under the current and
proposed situation.
This situation is virtually identical to Figure 6, which pertained to
policy B, equal retirement flows deferred to older ages. The reason that y1
has this shape is that under the assumption of perfect capital markets, work-
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present value of benefits is smaller under the proposed system. If 12> 0,
then the Y1 deviates from v by less than does y0. Additionally, the
point at which the earnings test becomes relevant is age 68, rather than age
65, so the kink occurs later.
All implications are the same as in case B and need not be repeated here.
Just to summarize, however, the main effect is that the present value of
pension benefits are likely to be smaller at the new normal age of 68 than
they were at the old normal age of 65. Additionally, the rate at which the
present value of pension benefits declines with deferred retirement is
lessened under the new system. Later average retirement occurs and there may
be some indirect effects on the pension and wage paths.
The situation is quite different if workers can only consume what they
earn in that period. Then, all workers begin retirement benefits at the
earliest possible age, conditional upon retirement. This means that y0and
are identical up to age 62 because retirement at any age on or before 62
induces the worker to begin benefits at that date. Since benefits at age 62
are the same under both systems, the paths converge as shown in Figure 10.
At T* -3,there is a kink upward in both the v and vfunctions.
The reason is that present value of social security benefits increases with
postponed retirement beyond that point until the normal age when the earnings
test takes hold. That date is T* under the current system andT* +3
under the proposed system. There is a kink downwardat the normal age when
theearnings test becomes binding.
The effects on optimal retirement depend uponthe location of the value
ofleisure function. Those who would haveretiredbefore T* under the
current system are induced to retire earlier under the proposed system. But




* ** T-3T T+3—40—
pane their retirement somewhat under the new system. The reason is that slow-
ing down the accrual rate makes it more worthwhile to retire either toward the
very beginning or toward the very end of benefit initiation dates, but reduces
the value of retiring somewhere in the middle. Later retirement could imply
higher costs to the social security system because the present value of
benefits increases in age of retirement. But this effect is likely to be
swamped by two other factors: First, some workers retire earlier and second,
retirement at a given age implies lower benefits under the proposed system for
many ages and benefits are never higher under the proposed system.
The effects on the pension system can be traced. First, the normal age
of retirement f or the purposes of pension determination is likely to move to a
new modal age of 68. At that age, the present value of pension benefits is
likely to be smaller than it was at age 65 under the current system because
fewer years of life are left and there is little reason to expect the benefit
flow to change from what it would have been at age 65. Additionally, w -v
is smaller between 65 and 68 so the rate at which pension value declines with
retirement postponed beyond 65 will be smaller under the proposed system.(If
anything w1(T) < w0(r) for T > T* —3because of a longer worklife and the
constraint imposed by equation (13).) However, since Yo > Yifor T* —3<
T < T*, the rate of decline in pension benefits with deferred retirement is
greater under the proposed system. It is possible (although not necessary)
that some very early retirees will receive higher pension benefits under the
proposed system than under the current one. This situation is depicted in
Figure 11. The expected present value of pension benefits under the current
system is less than under the proposed system for retirement before age 68.
Whether these effects exactly balance to leave total pension payments
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effects are to reduce the amount paid as pension to the workers. This may or
may not be offset by wages that exceed marginal product during these final
years. If all of these factors do not offset one another, then there will be
some indirect effects on wage and pension paths, but it is impossible to
predict the indirect effects.
To sum up, if workers can neither borrow nor lend, then the normal
retirement age shifts to 68, at which point pensions are smaller in present
value terms than they were under the old system at age 65. The pension
accrual pattern changes to favor early retirement until age 65 when it
switches, making postponed retirement more likely.
1 •TheShort Run
As before, distributional considerations prevent an unambiguous predic-
tion on what will occur during the short run. The optimal policy is to make
the pension value at age 68 less than it was before at age 65, but to change
the relationship as shown in Figure 11. It is impossible to levy some tax on
workers that leaves them all better off and still maintains (13). Depending
upon that age of retirement, some workers are subsidized while others are
penalized.
IV. Other Aspects of Pension Plans
A. Vesting
It is natural to consider whether the changes in the social security
system are likely to have any effects on vesting. Although it is impossible
to provide a definitive answer, most factors suggest that there will be little
or no effect on vesting provisions. There are three reasons.
First, ERISA places some strict limitations on the nature of vesting.
From an examination of the Bankers Trust (1980) study of corporate pension—43—
plans, it is not difficult to conclude that in large part, the ERISAprescrip-
tion for vesting are the ones most frequently found in practice.Although
ERISA may in large part have codified what already existed, tosome extent
deviant plans have been forced to conform to the ERISA standards. Unless
ERISA provisions on vesting are changed at the same timeas the social
security system is changed, there is no reason to believe that legal changes
will affect vesting.
Second, vesting is an event that occurs within the first ten, and at the
latest 15, years of the worker's career. Retirementusually occurs well
beyond that point. It is unlikely, therefore, that any changes in optimal
retirement ages will bump up against vesting constraints.
Third, the role of vesting is often overstated. All that vesting
normally does is allow the worker who quits to take with him the right to
receive his currently accrued benefits when he reaches normal retirementage.
This is not an important constraint for three reasons. First, sinceearly
retirement benefits are generally worth more than normal retirementbenefits,
and since vesting does not ensure the worker's right to receiveearly retire—
merit benefits, separation affects the value of the accrued pensioneven with
vesting. Second, accrual rates can be nonlinear, paying more for lateryears
of service (after vesting) than for earlier years. Tilting the accrualpath
is a way to render the vesting constraint unimportant. Third, sincethe
pension often depends upon final salary at that firm, quitting 10 to 20years
before retirement can leave the accrued benefits almost worthless in real
terms, especially in an inflationary environment.
All of these considerations suggest that vesting rules are not likely to
be affected by changes in the social security system.—44—
B. Social Security Offsets
Perhaps the most immediate effect of a change in the social security
structure on pensions workers through the social security offset provision.
Many pension plans provide an implicit or explicit supplement for retirement
that occurs before the age of social security entitlement. This supplement
vanishes as soon as social security begins. These supplements are intended to
smooth the flow of retirement income.
A number of the proposed policies considered in this analysis have pro-
visions for social security payments that begin later and/or are smaller.
Since most supplements are an inverse function of the social security payment,
these changes imply a direct increase in pension payments for early retire-
ment. Such an increase tends to undo much of what is desired as y changes.
As a result, one would expect the social security offset/supplement
provisions to be rewritten. Although it is impossible to say what the exact
nature of the rewrite would be, the following seems likely: If the purpose is
to maintain the flow of retirement income constant, assuming that the worker
begins receipt of benefits at the normal age,6 then the supplement often will
depend upon benefits received at age 68 rather than at age 65. However, if
early retirement age is left unchanged, some workers will receive a larger
total supplement than under the current situation. This increases the flow of
pension benefits and must be offset in one of four primary ways. First, wages
may fall over the early part of the life cycle. Since this causesother
distortions, this is the least likely of the four. Second, the size of the
annual early retirement supplement may be reduced. Some smoothing of post-
retirement income is sacrificed if this method is adopted. Third, the age of
6Some plans are based on benefits beginning at the earliest possible age.—45--
early retirement may be increased so as to leave the total expected flow of
early retirement benefits unchanged. Fourth, the average size of the pension
payments at normal age canbereduced so that post—retirement income can be
smoothed at the same original cost.
C. Other Provisions of Pension Plans
It is much more difficult to make conclusive statements about other
provisions of pension plans including the age of early retirement, minimum and
maximum years of service restrictions, and maximum age of starting employment
beyond which no pension accrual occurs. The reason is that there is no good
theory on why these provisions exist in the first place. M attempt to
analyze them is continued in Lazear (1984), and to a lesser extent in Blinder
(1982), but no satisfactory answers are given.
One possible way to treat these provisions is to assume that they are
onlydependent upon the normal age of retirement. If that age changes, the
provisions change accordingly. For example, a change in the normal retirement
agefrom 65 to 68 might shift the first age of early retirement from 55 to 58.
But there is no compelling reason to assume that this is the way that
provisions would be altered. As a result, nothing more is said on this issue.
V. Conclusion
Pensions vary a great deal and are quite complex, having many provisions
that are not well understood by analysts. The necessary consequence of
ignorance is a failure to be able to predict precisely the effect of a change
in policy on pension formulas. Still, using a relatively simple formulation,
this paper has provided a number of quite detailed predictions about the way
that pension formulas are likely to change in response to changes in the
social security rules. As such, it may provide a useful starting point for
policy makers.—46—
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